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CodeRifts · honesty map · measured

What each path does — and does not

A map of the integration paths, not another product pitch. Every row states what the path does and what it does not. Rows with only the first half are what produced the confusion this page exists to end.

How to read this. “Prevents” means the path can stop work without a human interpreting a report. “Reports” means a human or agent still decides. Nothing here invents a capability that is not already live.

Verified enforcement closure

ENFORCING

2 / 7

paths

ADVISORY

4 / 7

paths

EVIDENCE

1 / 7

paths

CodeRifts evaluates every listed path. 2 of 7 carry the ENFORCING label; the contract-gate row names two gaps. 4 of 7 are ADVISORY today, and 1 of 7 is an evidence mechanism that is not on the enforcement scale at all. Each missing condition is named in its own row below.

Dated 2026-10-20: this count is the 7 paths of this table. Two other tables count differently: the 15 operations of the Grok Bot execution surface (/install/grok-bot/#execution-surface, read by mutation) and the target verifiers (k8s-admission, gateway-verifier) on their own sections.

A path is labeled ENFORCING only when every known closure condition inside its stated boundary is satisfied and supported by evidence. Measured 2026-10-13; the labels above are read from /docs/data/enforcement-closure.json, and a build gate fails if this page disagrees with it.

Short table

Path Can prevent… Without extra wiring…
@coderifts/agent-guard a tool call (through its table) nothing — must wire tools
PR comment — reports only
CodeRifts / issuer a merge (if all four conditions) not a gate after bare install
contract-gate a merge, when the Action check is required and issuer-bound by default the Action posts a conclusion and does not require a receipt on the head commit
MCP tools — agent must honour the verdict
CLI / pre-push a push (if the hook runs) not a merge gate
END_TO_END, 2 vectors, RECORDED — (records a trusted-executor transition) not PATH B; not a GitHub merge; not externally witnessed

Enforcement and decision paths

Claude Code — PreToolUse hook

host hook · Write / Edit matcher · not a shell boundary

Measured 2026-09-27 from code.claude.com/docs/en/admin-setup: “Denying WebFetch blocks Claude's fetch tool, but if Bash is allowed, curl and wget can still reach any URL.” The gate is on the tool name, not on the effect. The same shape is the Write matcher on install: a shell that writes the file does not pass that matcher. One file for every machine is the fleet step.

Measured 2026-09-27 on Péter's machine, Claude Code 2.1.283, a file managed-settings.json, and not on this round: the managed file is reach, two user hooks on the same matcher did not run under allowManagedHooksOnly while the managed hook did, and a Bash curl to the URL denied as WebFetch was logged as an ordinary tool_decision accept with no link to the denied tool.

Indexed from r/ClaudeAI, 2026-06-22 (the thread URL returned no body on this run): “CLAUDE.md says what you would like to happen. A hook decides what is allowed to happen.” The wording looked for on that forum, “Use hooks — if a restriction matters, don’t rely on Claude remembering prose in CLAUDE.md once the context gets crowded”, was not found. The carrier informs, the hook stops, and the required check forces. audit what happened under the allow list.

A PreToolUse hook installed outside managed settings does not prove the call was refused: since Claude Code 2.1.287 a user-installed mod runs before it, can answer the call so the hook never runs, and can approve a call the hook blocked; only a hook in managed settings is final.

Source, read 2026-10-03: code.claude.com/docs/en/plugins/mods/events, code.claude.com/docs/en/plugins/mods/overview. claude --version the same day printed 2.1.283.

A contract commit without a trailer is the record.

Runtime guard — @coderifts/agent-guard

npm package · tool-table composition · fail-closed

ADVISORY · GUARDED TABLE · COMPOSITION DECLARES CLOSURE INCOMPLETE

Does

Prevents a breaking contract call from running when the call goes through the returned tool table. Fail-closed on BLOCK, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, unverifiable receipt, unwired monitoring, and similar integrity failures.

Does not

Does not see calls the host registers outside that table. Does not block a human merge on GitHub. Does not replace branch protection or the PR report path.

Becomes a gate when: wire only the tools returned by withCodeRifts / the guarded registry — the runtime sees only calls through that surface. See agents quickstart.

PR comment — GitHub App

one install · signed BLOCK / WARN / ALLOW on the pull request

ADVISORY · PR

Does

Reports a signed governance decision on every pull request that changes analysable contracts (and related opt-in gates). Visibility for reviewers with no CI YAML required.

Does not

Prevents nothing on its own. A red comment does not stop merge, push, or an agent tool call unless something else enforces the verdict.

The opt-in gates are named, not implied. MigraGuard is one: switched on per repository, it reads the migration file together with a live code reference and holds both in memory — neither is persisted. It appears in the Policy Violations list of the comment, and like the rest of the comment it reports.

Becomes a gate when: nothing beyond installing the App. See GitHub integration.

Kubernetes admission webhook — coderifts/k8s-admission customer-hosted · open source

Admission review · denies the apply

ENFORCING · ADMISSION · CUSTOMER-PINNED KEYRING

Measured 2026-09-20 from the repository’s own README: fail-closed, with named deny reasons — receipt_missing, receipt_invalid, scope_mismatch, dsse_malformed. It runs in your cluster and you pin KEYRING_PATH.

Becomes a gate when: the webhook is registered for the resources you care about and the keyring you pinned is the one that signed the receipts.

The boundary it states about us: “No CodeRifts-operated service is called at admit time.” That is the point and also the limit — nothing we run can observe, delay or rescue an admit decision made in your cluster, and a keyring you stop updating is a keyring we cannot refresh for you.

The denying party is the API server. Kubernetes v1 documents failurePolicy default Fail (admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1, kubernetes v1.36.1; the reference page was revised 2026-08-11): an error calling the webhook rejects the request, and an explicit allowed: false denies the request whatever failurePolicy says. Ignore is the other value, and on a call error the API server lets the request through. Measured on r/kubernetes, 2024-05-02: a pod IAM mutating webhook shipped with failurePolicy: Ignore, and pods started without the credentials the webhook was there to mount. The operator wrote that Ignore “allowed pods to start despite failure of the Webhook” and set it to Fail. Nothing on the admitted object tells a later reader that the webhook never ran. The receipt is what that reader can verify locally, against the keyring pinned in the cluster, and a CodeRifts outage is not on that path. Fail is the availability price: while this webhook cannot be called, matching creates and updates are denied. The published manifest sets failurePolicy: Fail.

Gateway verifier — coderifts/gateway-verifier target-side · open source

Request path · refuses the call

ENFORCING · REQUEST · CALLER-PINNED KEYRING

It calls itself a target verifier: it checks evidence the caller already holds, then forwards. Measured 2026-09-20 from its README — proves the receipt token is authentic under the caller-pinned keyring, unexpired for the configured clock, and that the resolved intent (operation and target) matches the receipt scope.

Becomes a gate when: it sits in front of the target and every route it must protect is mapped. A missing or unmapped route is refused, not waved through.

Does not prove: that the change was preflighted correctly; that execution_action was CONTINUE; that artifacts still match; that the upstream policy is right; that the keyring is fresh. It is not an analysis service — nothing here asks whether a request is risky.

Required status check — CodeRifts / issuer app_id 2860592 · the CodeRifts App

GitHub check run · can block merge when fully configured

ENFORCING · MERGE · NAME + INTEGRATION ID 2860592

Otherwise ADVISORY. Otherwise nothing. Measured 2026-10-11 on coderifts/demo: ruleset 22074842 alone, enforcement active, bypass_actors empty, required checks CodeRifts / issuer (integration id 2860592) and CodeRifts / contract-gate (integration id 15368). Classic branch protection is deleted: GET /repos/coderifts/demo/branches/main/protection answers 404 Branch not protected. enforce_admins is absent from the ruleset response. An admin override is refused with “2 of 2 required status checks are failing.” The template job name is the context: CodeRifts / contract-gate, GitHub Actions 15368. The App context is CodeRifts / issuer, app id 2860592. Replace the old App-bound CodeRifts / contract-gate row with CodeRifts / issuer. Left in place, that row stays expected. The reader is the required check; the App is the second, issuer-side context.

Does

Can prevent a merge when ruleset 22074842 requires this context, the check is bound to the CodeRifts App (app_id: 2860592), an analysable schema is present, and bypass_actors is empty. Measured 2026-10-11 on coderifts/demo, classic branch protection answers 404 Branch not protected, and enforce_admins is absent from the ruleset response.

Does not

Does not block by default after a bare App install. Name-only required checks (no app_id) are spoofable by anyone who can post a check with that name; issuer-bound ones (app_id set) narrow that to anyone who can edit .github/workflows, because the enforcing issuer is shared. Neutral completion (no analysable schema) is non-blocking. Does not stop runtime agent calls. Read 2026-10-12 from GET /repos/coderifts/demo/rulesets/22074842: strict_required_status_checks_policy is true. No human review is required either: required_pull_request_reviews is unset, so the check is the gate.

Becomes a gate when: all four conditions together — documented at Make the Check Block a Merge (link, not repeated here).

Contract-gate — CodeRifts / contract-gate app_id 15368 · the GitHub Actions App

the reader is the required check; the App is the second, issuer-side context

ENFORCING · MERGE · NAME + INTEGRATION ID 15368, NOT A WORKFLOW SHA

The pin ladder, and only the last rung closes it: NAME ONLY is spoofable by anyone able to create the named check · ISSUER BOUND narrows the set to actors able to use or edit a workflow under the shared issuer · IMMUTABLE WORKFLOW SHA closes workflow identity. Measured 2026-10-11 on coderifts/demo: ruleset 22074842 alone, enforcement active, bypass_actors empty. CodeRifts / contract-gate bound to integration id 15368 is a required context since 2026-09-28. Pull request 33 check-run 114510055851 is that check. Classic branch protection answers 404 Branch not protected.

Does

The reader is trailer-first: it issues a receipt if the head commit has none, verifies that receipt locally against the pinned keyring, and never backfills the commit. The customer workflow also listens for merge_group, because a required check that only listens to pull_request is never reported on the merge queue. The required reader context is CodeRifts / contract-gate, GitHub Actions 15368. The template job name is the context. The App context is CodeRifts / issuer.

Does not

The App check is a different context, CodeRifts / issuer. On coderifts/demo pull request 4, head a81e6092fea0ca82696a6d252441afde4117f2fa, check_run 111270526393 concluded failure on 2026-10-03T18:58:29Z. This page does not call that conclusion neutral. Replace the old App-bound CodeRifts / contract-gate row with CodeRifts / issuer. Left in place, that row stays expected. A pin by check name alone (a bare contexts[] entry with no issuer binding) is also not a gate. It is spoofable, and CLI enforce --check (since 4.9.0) reports name-only required checks as not inescapable. Still true on 8.9.1, read from the published package on 2026-11-13: a required check listed with no app_id is NOT_VERIFIED (no_issuer_binding; a legacy contexts[] entry is legacy_contexts_no_issuer_binding), and inescapable_deploy stays false until every layer is VERIFIED. That is the package's code, not a run against a repository: npx -y coderifts@8.9.1 enforce --check coderifts/demo without a token reports required_check UNVERIFIABLE (it needs GITHUB_TOKEN with administration:read) and inescapable_deploy: false. The Actions issuer is github-actions[bot] (app id 15368), which every workflow in the repository shares, so an app id pin proves the check came from Actions, not that it came from the CodeRifts workflow. Anyone who can edit .github/workflows can post a passing check under the same issuer. Pinning the required workflow by immutable SHA is what closes that. A red PR comment prevents nothing on its own.

Measured on gate v0.11.6 (commit 59e9752e69f6946778a05120e2beb48907c3e211): the default profile is enforcing, and require-receipt-trailer defaults false. A head commit that already carries a receipt is verified offline against the pinned keyring, and that run does not call preflight. With the flag false and an api-key set, a missing trailer falls through to issuance: the receipt is verified offline, written to the step summary and the job outputs, and never written onto the commit. With no key, that run fails receipt_trailer_missing and does not call preflight. With require-receipt-trailer set to true, no verifying trailer or sidecar fails before any preflight call, on every profile, reason receipt_trailer_required. On merge_group, base_mismatch or head_mismatch with the flag false falls through to issuance for the queue SHAs; repo_mismatch and mode_mismatch stay failures. With the flag true, a mismatch stays a failure.

Measured 2026-10-11 on coderifts/demo pull request 33. The only file change is one comment in .github/workflows/contract-gate.yml (# control-plane probe 2026-10-11). A pull request that changes a control-plane path (.github/workflows/*.yml, .coderifts.yml, .coderifts/keys/, .coderifts/trust/, .coderifts/signing/, or an audit file) is never neutral. On head 2ca2aca2ccbb73c13c07f1bf10ac25de9f4d31ca, filter=all shows two issuer checks. CodeRifts / issuer check-run 114510017575 concluded failure, started 2026-10-11T15:50:22Z, completed 2026-10-11T15:50:35Z. The title is REQUEST_APPROVAL · merge · sha256:c0a1260…634a79 · expires 2026-10-11T19:50:24Z · CONTROL_PLANE_CHANGE. The summary says: Requires 2 distinct approvers from engine_verdict_approvers on the base branch; have 0 (a change to the approver list is judged by the base list, never by its own). Review 5483938946 was approved at 2026-10-11T15:57:50Z. Comment 6110898348 at 2026-10-11T16:01:28Z is /rerun. CodeRifts / issuer check-run 114512261388 concluded failure, started 2026-10-11T16:01:30Z, completed 2026-10-11T16:01:42Z. The title is REQUEST_APPROVAL · merge · sha256:c0a1260…634a79 · expires 2026-10-11T20:01:32Z · CONTROL_PLANE_CHANGE. The summary says: Requires 2 distinct approvers from engine_verdict_approvers on the base branch; have 1 (a change to the approver list is judged by the base list, never by its own). CodeRifts / contract-gate check-run 114510055851 concluded success, 2026-10-11T15:50:36Z to 2026-10-11T15:50:40Z.

Does not prove: that two GitHub logins are two people. The reader check stayed green on this control-plane-only change, so the merge is held by the issuer alone. A repository administrator editing the ruleset is outside this.

The gap that the demo lists one approver is closed. On 2026-10-12 the base list names Mumblemanatee and zsobpeter-code. The gap that stays: the reader is green on a control-plane-only change (run 114510055851) until the demo workflow pins contract-gate 0.11.9. v0.11.9 is released (commit 82e1153, 2026-10-12) and the demo workflow still pins 59e9752 (v0.11.6).

The reader is the required check; the App is the second, issuer-side context. The template job name is the context.

Becomes a gate when: require the Action’s check, bound to its issuer rather than pinned by name — coderifts setup-required-check, or the Action’s ENFORCEMENT.md. On the demo head above the issuer check concluded failure. Same names as docs.

MCP tools — three canonical tools

preflight_change_set · verify_receipt · get_decision_details

ADVISORY · CAN ISSUE AUTHORITY · DOES NOT EXECUTE

Does

Gives an agent a preflight that is deterministic per engine build and clock (preflight_mode required: analyze = risk only; authorize = operation-bound + optional receipt), receipt verification, and stored-decision lookup over Streamable HTTP.

Does not

Prevents nothing by itself. The agent (or host) must treat an authorize verdict as binding (branch on execution_action; verify receipt). Analyze is informational — not permission. Without a runtime guard, a model can ignore the verdict and still call the broken API.

Becomes a gate when: an agent or host that treats authorize + receipt verification as binding — e.g. wire @coderifts/agent-guard, or refuse non-CONTINUE execution_action. Contract: Decision Spec v2. See for-agents and mcp.json.

The Agent Card at /.well-known/agent.json is discovery, not permission. POST /api/v1/a2a/diff diffs our own contract shape (output_schema, handoff_protocol, message_format) and issues no receipt. It does not serve this card.

CLI / pre-push hook

local check before code leaves the machine

ADVISORY · INSTALLED PRE-PUSH HOOK · TWO IN-HOOK FAIL-OPEN PATHS

Does

Can prevent a push when configured as a pre-push (or CI job) that fails on a bad verdict. Catches issues before they hit the remote.

Does not

Does not prevent a merge on GitHub once the branch is already updated (e.g. web UI merge, force-push by another actor, or a push that bypassed the hook). Does not wrap agent tool calls at runtime.

Becomes a gate when: the hook or job must actually run and fail closed on the verdict. See CLI integration.

Evidence path

Evidence is not enforcement. This path proves what happened; it stops nothing.

Conformance END_TO_END, 2 vectors, RECORDED — @coderifts/conformance@0.8.12

public npm package · recorded assurance profiles · hermetic bare-Git

EVIDENCE · PROVES · DOES NOT PREVENT

Does

Reports END_TO_END COVERED / RECORDED, 2 vector(s) via TARGET_STATE_TRANSITION_PROVEN: a governed ref moved to the authorized commit under a signed grant, observed afterwards by a separate read-only process. Seven profiles exist, 2 on LIVE evidence and 5 on RECORDED. That count is not this profile's 2 vectors.

Does not

Does not mean CodeRifts witnessed or signed the provider state. Boundary, exactly: proof_scope TRUSTED_EXECUTOR, provider_witness NOT_APPLICABLE, externally_witnessed false. Not a provider merge (PATH B). Not externally witnessed. Not the GitHub positive provider-loop.

Becomes a gate when: read the honesty table, not the number alone. See What each proof proves. The GitHub loop stays on provider canary.

Hosts

This block names a host write-up. It is not one of the seven paths in the closure above, and it does not move those counts.

Dots and the gate records the ChatGPT plugin URL, a custom rule we would write, and the required check on an open demo pull request. dots is not available in the EEA; we could not run it. we could not run dots from the EEA.

ChatGPT app (custom MCP) records the four clicks that connected a personal app on ChatGPT Plus in the EU on 2026-09-29. That app reports. It does not issue receipts.

MCP server repository is the required check on the repository that holds the tool file. The blocking pull requests measured on coderifts/demo are pull request 4, an OpenAPI change, and pull request 26, an MCP tool manifest.