What a signed receipt can and cannot evidence under DORA, NIS2 and the AI Act
2026-10-02. Legal review pending — this is the author's reading of the texts, not legal advice.
1. The obligations
DORA, Article 9(4)(e) — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj/eng): financial entities need a documented ICT change-management process under which changes to ICT systems are recorded, tested, assessed, approved, implemented and verified in a controlled manner. The process must be approved by the appropriate lines of management and include specific protocols. "Recorded" is one of six separate requirements.
Article 17 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1774/oj/eng) sets the minimum elements of those procedures, for changes to software, hardware, firmware components, systems or security parameters:
1. As part of the safeguards to preserve the availability, authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of data, financial entities shall include in the ICT change management procedures referred to in Article 9(4), point (e), of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, in respect of all changes to software, hardware, firmware components, systems, or security parameters, all of the following elements: (a) a verification of whether the ICT security requirements have been met; (b) mechanisms to ensure the independence of the functions that approve changes and the functions responsible for requesting and implementing those changes; (c) a clear description of the roles and responsibilities to ensure that: (i) changes are specified and planned; (ii) an adequate transition is designed; (iii) the changes are tested and finalised in a controlled manner; (iv) there is an effective quality assurance; (d) the documentation and communication of change details, including: (i) the purpose and scope of the change; (ii) the timeline for the implementation of the change; (iii) the expected outcomes; (e) the identification of fall-back procedures and responsibilities, including procedures and responsibilities for aborting changes or recovering from changes not successfully implemented; (f) procedures, protocols, and tools to manage emergency changes that provide adequate safeguards; (g) procedures to document, re-evaluate, assess, and approve emergency changes after their implementation, including workarounds and patches; (h) the identification of the potential impact of a change on existing ICT security measures and an assessment of whether such change requires the adoption of additional ICT security measures.
Quoted 2026-10-17T17:55:23Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32024R1774, Article 17(1). Measured cell: the signed decision records one evaluated change set. Does not cover: the receipt does not record a fall-back plan, an emergency change, or the independence of the approving function.
Article 12 of the same Regulation requires change-management events to be logged, the logs protected against tampering, deletion and unauthorised access, and system clocks synchronised to a documented reliable time source.
(c) the requirement to log events related to all of the following: (i) logical and physical access control, as referred to in Article 21, and identity management; (ii) capacity management; (iii) change management; (iv) ICT operations, including ICT system activities; (v) network traffic activities, including ICT network performance; (d) measures to protect logging systems and log information against tampering, deletion, and unauthorised access at rest, in transit, and, where relevant, in use; (e) measures to detect a failure of logging systems; (f) without prejudice to any applicable regulatory requirements under Union or national law, the synchronisation of the clocks of each of the financial entity’s ICT systems upon a documented reliable reference time source.
Quoted 2026-10-17T17:55:23Z from the same TXT load, Article 12(2) points (c) to (f). Measured cell: the record-keeping page keeps the receipt fields. Does not cover: those fields are not the logging procedures, the protection of log information, or the clock synchronisation in the quote.
AI Act, Articles 12 and 26 — Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng): Article 12(1) requires high-risk AI systems to technically allow automatic event logging over their lifetime. Article 12(2) says logging must enable the recording of events relevant to identifying risk situations or substantial modifications, post-market monitoring, and monitoring operation under Article 26(5). Article 12(3) adds minimum log content for remote biometric identification systems (Annex III, point 1(a)).
High-risk AI systems shall technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system. 2. In order to ensure a level of traceability of the functioning of a high-risk AI system that is appropriate to the intended purpose of the system, logging capabilities shall enable the recording of events relevant for: (a) identifying situations that may result in the high-risk AI system presenting a risk within the meaning of Article 79(1) or in a substantial modification; (b) facilitating the post-market monitoring referred to in Article 72; and (c) monitoring the operation of high-risk AI systems referred to in Article 26(5). Deployers shall assign human oversight to natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority, as well as the necessary support. Deployers of high-risk AI systems shall keep the logs automatically generated by that high-risk AI system to the extent such logs are under their control, for a period appropriate to the intended purpose of the high-risk AI system, of at least six months, unless provided otherwise in applicable Union or national law, in particular in Union law on the protection of personal data.
Quoted 2026-10-17T17:55:21Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32024R1689, Article 12(1), Article 12(2), Article 26(2) and Article 26(6). Measured cell: the signed decision is one change record. Does not cover: it is not the automatic event log, and it does not provide the deployer's retention of at least six months.
Article 26 assigns deployer duties: human oversight by natural persons with the necessary competence, training, authority and support (26(2)); monitoring operation in line with the instructions for use and, where relevant, informing the provider (26(5)); and keeping system-generated logs under the deployer's control for a period appropriate to the intended purpose, at least six months unless Union or national law provides otherwise (26(6)).
These concern high-risk systems. As amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj/eng). Quoted 2026-10-17T18:00:31Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32026R1744: Therefore, it is appropriate that the date of application of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter III is set to 2 December 2027 for AI systems classified as high-risk pursuant to Article 6(2) and Annex III, and to 2 August 2028 for AI systems classified as high-risk pursuant to Article 6(1) and Annex I. Does not cover: that sentence names Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter III, not a receipt. Check the classification and any exception before treating them as applicable.
NIS2, Article 21(2)(e) — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng): security in the acquisition, development and maintenance of network and information systems, including vulnerability handling and disclosure. The English text of the Directive does not use the term "change management". Re-read 2026-10-17T17:55:22Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32022L2555: the phrase occurs zero times.
(e) security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure;
Quoted 2026-10-17T17:55:22Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32022L2555, Article 21(2), point (e). Measured cell: the record-keeping page carries the same point. Does not cover: the point does not name change recording.
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2690/oj/eng), Annex point 6.4, does — but only for the entity types it lists: DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing, data centre and content delivery network providers, managed service and managed security service providers, online marketplaces, online search engines, social networking platforms, and trust service providers. Not NIS2 entities generally. Point 6.4.2 covers releases, modifications, emergency changes and configuration changes: documented and, based on the risk assessment, tested and assessed before implementation. Under 6.4.3, if an emergency prevents the regular procedure, the entity documents the outcome and why the procedure could not be followed. That is not DORA's after-the-fact assessment and approval.
6.4.2. The procedures referred to in point 6.4.1 shall be applied for releases, modifications and emergency changes of any software and hardware in operation and changes to the configuration. The procedures shall ensure that those changes are documented and, based on the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1, tested and assessed in view of the potential impact before being implemented. 6.4.3. In the event that the regular change management procedures could not be followed due to an emergency, the relevant entities shall document the result of the change, and the explanation for why the procedures could not be followed.
Quoted 2026-10-17T17:55:24Z from the TXT form of CELEX:32024R2690, Annex points 6.4.2 and 6.4.3. Measured cell: the signed decision records one evaluated change set. Does not cover: it is not the documented test, the risk assessment, or the emergency explanation in those points.
2. How practice answers it — in layers
The organisation's own change process carries the weight: independent approval, test records, fall-back and an emergency path, usually spread across an ITSM ticket, code review and repository configuration.
A machine gate blocks a merge only on a path where branch protection or a ruleset requires the check and bypass is closed. That is evidence about the configured path. It does not show that no other path could carry an unauthorised change, nor that a change was implemented or verified.
A signed record bound to a hash of the evaluated change set can support a record of what was authorised, if the recipient matches the hash to the change set it holds. Offline verification checks the signature against a pinned key snapshot. It cannot establish current key trust, revocation, or that the issuer's clock was accurate.
For the AI Act, the system's logging capability and the deployer's oversight, monitoring and retention are separate duties. An external change gate does neither.
3. CodeRifts: what it does
On a boundary that requires it, a contract change does not cross without a signed grant for that exact change set. CodeRifts reads the diff of the contracts a pull request touches — OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI and MCP tool manifests, together as one change set — classifies what breaks (a removed field, a parameter that became required, a narrowed enum, a tool whose description gained an instruction), and answers with a decision and a machine instruction. On GitHub, a required check refuses the merge until a receipt for that diff verifies on the runner; the receipt names the operation it was granted for (merge, deploy, publish or a tool call) and expires. Analysis is free and needs no account; the check is on the GitHub Marketplace (https://github.com/marketplace/actions/coderifts-contract-gate).
What it signs, and what it does not
What it signs. A receipt is a signed token: a short JSON body and a raw Ed25519 signature over its fields (format v4, specified in the open verifier's RECEIPT_FORMAT.md). Its central field, fp, is the change-set fingerprint. It is a SHA-256 over each artifact's type, id and the hashes of its exact before and after text, together with the operation, environment, repository, branch, pull request and policy profile the caller declared. So the signature binds the diff and the declared operation, and anyone who holds the same change set can recompute it. The token also carries the signing key id (kid), the issue time and a hard expiry (expires_at). The decision itself — decision, execution_action, the operation field and the rest of the decision envelope, including its artifact_digest — is not in the token. It is bound by bh, the hash of the canonical envelope without its receipt, which the open verifier re-checks when it is handed the envelope. A token verified on its own therefore shows which change set and declared operation were evaluated, and until when; what was decided is shown only together with the envelope it came with. An execution grant, when one is requested, is a separate signed token. It binds the receipt by hash and adds the executor, the target, the hash of the content to be written, a state and nonce check, and a single-use window of minutes.
The open verifier checks it offline against a pinned key snapshot — no account, no call to us. A decision is an authorisation answer for the submitted request, not an observation that anything was merged, deployed or published.
It may support the "recorded" part of DORA Article 9(4)(e). Under NIS2 it is at most supporting evidence for Article 21(2)(e); for an entity under Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 it might sit next to the evidence for point 6.4. The fields do not become stronger evidence because a text is less detailed.
It does not:
- name the human approver. A GitHub review names a login, not the account holder's role or whether the process was followed. Distinct logins do not prove distinct people.
- test, assess, implement or verify anything.
- record a fall-back plan, an emergency change, or the independence of the approving function.
- replace a high-risk AI system's own logs, its classification, human oversight or the deployer's retention.
- establish whether a signing key is currently trusted. A recently compromised key still verifies against a snapshot that does not yet show its revocation. Where current authorisation cannot be established,
currently_authorizedisnull, nottrue. The hosted verify_receipt route, given a token alone, answers currently_authorized null. The open offline verifier prints VERIFIED_CURRENT and has no currently_authorized field.
Measured today: the open verifier (https://coderifts.com/verify/) and a required check on our own demo repository that blocks on both contexts — a configuration fact we re-measure before calling it enforced. Shipped, but not installed by anyone else: a Kubernetes admission verifier and an agent tool guard. No external repository requires the check yet.
4. How to read it
In a DORA change file, a receipt is one line: what was authorised, for which hash, until when and under which key. Next to it belong the test record, an approver in the independent function, the fall-back plan, the emergency path if one was used, and — where the merge path is actually closed — the required-check configuration. The receipt does not stand in for any of those.
The short page: https://coderifts.com/docs/evidence/record-keeping/